CPEC, Is it corridor of opportunity for INDIA?

What is CPEC?

At the time of the economic slowdown, Chinese leadership has started to invest abroad strategically to save the country from the slow economic growth. With large population , unequal income distribution, large internal debt, surplus industrial output, lack of jobs ,stagnant investments and idle money with Chinese government made the xi’s government to initiate the Silk Road Economic Belt(One Road One Belt) initiative. Among the several corridors in the OBOR, The most important one for the india is CPEC( China-Pakistan Economic Corridor), which has the $46 billion dollar investments from the china, which is nearly 20% of Pakistan’s GDP.

With a spectacular GDP having trillions of dollars in reserve, China is seeking to invest in projects abroad that can enhance connectivity, utilise idle capital and sustain its economic growth. China has created support clusters to fund infrastructure projects outside through AIIB, Silk Route Fund, and through its own CITIC, China Exim Bank. In this context, CPEC is conceived as a project that will give China overland access to the Arabian Sea through the Pakistani port of Gwadar, bring development and prosperity to Pakistan - a long-time friend and ally, and cement strategic ties between the two. Innocuous as it may appear, with its passage through the disputed territory of Gilgit-Baltistan and its access and control of Gwadar port - situated in close proximity to the energy-rich Western Asian region, CPEC has provoked the regional/sub-continental security debate ever since it was announced with great gusto by China and Pakistan.

Enveloped in a geopolitical chimera, the focus of the emerging discourse on CPEC is clearly tilted towards its economic and strategic imperatives. However, the flip side of the project concerning its political viability is being ignored. Considering that the CPEC is set to traverse through Xinjiang, Gilgit Baltistan and Balochistan simmering with large-scale political discontent, there are lurking uncertainties facing the future prospects of the project, widely hailed as a harbinger of enhanced regional connectively and trade.

The staple factors put forth to justify the CPEC include China’s geographical constraints vis-à-vis southern waters in the Indian Ocean as well as Pakistan’s ever intensifying energy crisis. The idea of connecting China to the strategically important waters of the Arabian Sea though has evolved over a period of time, way back to when the Karakoram Highway was constructed during the 1960’s and 1970’s. The strategic highway built through the only land link between China and Pakistan (read Gilgit Baltistan) in many ways blueprinted the idea of an intensive connectivity network of what is today envisaged as the grand CPEC project.

The issue brief is an attempt to assess the CPEC on the viability quotient as it stands on the plank of long-raging political questions and evaluate the level of concord in the three major geographical segments of the corridor. Premised on the fact that the political conflict in these regions has received comparatively lesser attention in the overall CPEC discourse, the issue brief seeks to un-layer strands of commonalties in these regions vis-a-vis political unrest and collate the larger complexities of prolonged neglect and abject exclusion. Parallel to the political prism, the brief takes into account the geopolitical discontent triggered by the CPEC, whilst looking at likely impacts to be incurred on the complex triangular geopolitical equations between India, Pakistan and China in general and CPEC in particular.

The Chinese President’s visit gave rise to the signing of 51 Memoranda of Understanding and projects worth $46 billion in sectors which include energy, infrastructure, security, and broader economic development. For energy, $34 billion investment was envisaged and $12 billion in infrastructure projects. It was estimated that $15.5 billion would be spent on coal, wind, solar, and hydroelectric projects. The ambitious plan includes energy projects with a capacity close to 10,000 MW to be completed by 2018, with more to follow. Most of the money is expected to be spent on the construction of the corridor itself. One of the key externalities to the Chinese investment is the fact that a “Special Security Division” of the Pakistan Army, consisting of perhaps 10,000 Pakistani troops and headed by a Major General, would be set up to guard the Chinese workers and their investment, particularly in Balochistan, given the militancy and insurgency in the province.

Let us merismos the Geography:- 

The CPEC stretches across zones witnessing conflict, subjugation and political exclusion. These regions continue to be tarred in raging political discontent and are inflicted by deep seated deficit of trust. Slated to originate in Kashgar in the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region (XUAR), the corridor is designed to enter Gilgit Baltistan via the Khujerab Pass before spreading out in parts of Pakistan. In Pakistan, the CPEC travels through Khyber Paktunkhwa, Punjab before culminating at the warm water deep sea port at Gwadar, situated at the southern edge of the restive Balochistan province. While Xinjiang for long has witnessed an incessant ethnic strife offering stiff resistance to Han dominance, Gilgit Baltistan is reeling under lack of constitutional status and political ambiguity since the region’s violence-embroiled accession to Pakistan in 1947. Balochistan in Pakistan is infested by insurgency and prominent political groups led by ethnic Balochs have directly challenged the writ of the state during multiple phases of extreme violence and conflict.

All three regions - Xinjiang, Gilgit Baltistan and Balochistan - share rather conspicuous parallels concerning territorial contestations, rejection of state apparatus by the local populace who claim a legitimate right over local resources. Similarly, all these geopolitically key regions contain vast expanses of landmass - Xinjiang is the largest administrative division of China, Balochistan forms 46 per cent of Pakistan while Gilgit Baltistan forms the major portion of what is referred to as Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir (POK). It is rather intriguing that the CPEC which is riding high on the developmental, network-connectivity agenda, boasting of a mammoth multi-billion budget, is traversing regions where the state has allegedly been deeply involved in altering demographics to diminish/wipe their exclusive ethnic characters. As a result, strong undercurrents of rebellion and dissidence prevail in these geographical entities.

Xinjiang: Xinjiang, the western most part of China where the CPEC originates, has been reeling under strife owing to political and ethnic reasons. The political discontent stems from ethnic/identity issues and of late has been triggered by relentless subjugation of the majority Uighur population in the province (and a minority in China). Groups such as Turkistan Islamic Party (formerly the East Turkestan Islamic Movement-ETIM) advocate Xinjiang’s independence from China. They have refused to accede to the Chinese control on the region obtained in 1949, challenging it on the pretext that the origin of the state lay somewhere else and it does not belong to the Peoples Republic of China (PRC).

Gilgit-Baltistan: As noted earlier, Gilgit Baltistan is part of POK. While under Pakistan’s territorial control, the region is still not considered a part of it either constitutionally or politically after almost seven decades. More significantly, the region is claimed by India as part of the erstwhile princely state of Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) ever since the Instrument of Accession was signed in India’s favour by Maharaja Hari Singh in October 1947. An inordinate wait for political rights and identity has been aggravated by a prolonged phase of political neglect and state apathy. Nationalist sentiments have spawned in Gilgit Baltistan over the years and have found vent in an array of nationalist/political groups some of whom are defiant to the extent of seeking independence from Pakistan.

Balochistan: Balochistan did not immediately accede to the newly formed Pakistan in 1947. Its formal accession to the latter in March 1948 was preceded by a spell of uncertainty and intervention by the Pakistan military. Ever since then, the region has been embroiled in a perpetual state of turmoil and political tussle with the Pakistani state. The insurgency in Balochistan has refused to recede even after military’s stringent measures to tide over violence. The Balochistan situation has degenerated especially since 2003-04 under a patently ruthless regime involving indiscriminate state action against individuals, institutions and political groups refusing to comply with Pakistan’s control. Draconian tales of forced disappearances, death squads and extra-judicial killings have continuously poured out of Balochistan on a regular basis.

Resources: Coincidentally, the three in-focus regions are rich in natural resources. Designated as ‘‘national energy strategy base’’, Xinjiang houses oil reserves that run in billions of tons, accounting for 1/5th of China’s aggregate oil reserves. Besides, coal reserves are about 40 per cent of the total followed by the largest gas reserves within China.Irrespective of ethnic strife, China has engaged in expanding refineries and extraction activities in the region. Gilgit-Baltistan has vast reserves of minerals and hydro power potential while Balochistan is blessed with significant gas reserve.

The availability of resources unfortunately does not reflect as much in the development indexes concerning these regions. For long, these resources remained untapped before the states in question decided to harness these by either outsourcing them to external players like China (in Balochistan and Gilgit Baltistan) or diverting the resource wealth towards purposes other than local development. Sustained neglect of local interests has accentuated popular angst in these regions which has frequently led to protests and disruptive activities.

Though these regions are endowed with many resources, these regions are underdeveloped and became zone of contentions for their respective states. To bring the stability and prosperity, Sustainable development, inclusive growth and good governance are required. 

Thatswhy, This CPEC is planned to bring the stability, prosperity, security, economic growth to regions, through which it passes. Though CPEC is giving a lot to the china and pakistan, it is looking as provocative for the India. Though, India has the security and geographical implications, it has to engage with china and pakistan for amicable solutions without loosing its territorial sovereignty over the Gilgit-Baltistan region, which is part of the india as per the maharaja hari singh’s treaty of accession.  By engaging with CPEC, India will enter into the inaccessible areas such as deep into the heart of pakistan, afghanistan, central asia and other regions too. India has the chance to convert the existential threat into the opportunity to increase trade, commerce, connectivity, security, people-to-people contacts, energy security and many other things. To achieve that India has to propel forward with sense of dynamism(we cannot inhibt the dynamism of engagement in international affairs for example more russian engagement with pakistan would definitely irksome to india), instead of looking at the Pakistan and china with the lense of suspicion. 

Back Door Diplomacy:- More engagement with china will definitely increase the pressure over the Pakistan. Historically, more engagements happens through back route channels for example, president nixon's trip to china and last year modi' december 25th trip happend through back route channel only and this type of back door engagement with pakistan may bring the peace in the most problematic Radcliffe line region.